More research seems warranted to use existing knowledge about conflict to illuminate the ways social conflict may result from global environmental change. This research would investigate the ways environmental changes may affect organized social groups and their resource bases and would hypothesize links between those effects and conflict. A first step is to construct an analytical framework for identifying the possible routes from particular environmental changes to particular types of conflict.
The framework of Homer-Dixon provides a start, for causes of violent conflict. Case analyses of past social conflicts can be used to assess hypotheses drawn from such analytic frameworks. Research on Conflict Resolution and Management Social scientists have also identified a number of approaches for resolving or managing policy disputes, some of which are beginning to be studied in the context of environmental conflicts.
These include mediation techniques intended to address the value dimension of environmental conflict e. The nature of technological conflicts suggests, however, that over the long-term, management is a more realistic goal than stable resolution. Recent work on risk communication is potentially relevant to social responses to global change because global change problems, like those to which that literature refers, are characterized by high levels of scientific uncertainty and great potential for conflict about social choices Covello et al.
This work suggests that institutions responsible for decisions about global change will also have to manage conflict. These institutions will need to provide accurate information, but should not expect information to resolve conflict. The institutions will need to make a place for the stakeholders to be represented from the earliest stages of the decision process, ensure openness in processes of policy decision, include mechanisms for the main actors to have access to relevant information from sources they trust, and use the conflicting perspectives and interpretations of current knowledge and uncertainty to inform the ongoing debate National Research Council, b; Stern, Research Needs Relatively little is known about the structure of particular conflicts about global change at the local, national, and international levels or about which means will be most effective in dealing with them.
Therefore, we recommend increased empirical research, including both field studies and laboratory-simulation studies, to clarify the sources and structures of particular environmental conflicts and to test the efficacy of alternative techniques for their resolution and institutions for their management.
In Chapter 3 we presented cases to illustrate how human actions can contribute to the causes of global change. Here we present three cases to illustrate the human consequences of, and responses to, environmental change. Taken together, they show the importance of all the major human systems involved described later in the chapter and the ways that conflicts are played out and choices made within these systems. As mentioned earlier, the most successful effort to date to address a global environmental problem by international agreement.
This regime, in its current form, commits its members to phasing out the production and consumption of CFCs and a number of related chemicals by the year The regime represents the first concerted international effort to mitigate ''a global atmosphere problem before serious environmental impacts have been conclusively detected'' Morrisette, The political history of the ozone regime begins as a national issue in the United States and a handful of other Western countries in the early s, in connection with emissions from supersonic transport SST aircraft and then from aerosol spray cans Downing and Kates, ; Morrisette, Environmental groups organized opposition to the development of the SST and to the extensive use of aerosols.
Individual responses led to a sharp drop in sales of aerosol products Morrisette et al. The U. However, the EPA ruled that other uses of CFCs, such as in refrigeration, were both essential and lacked available substitutes. Ozone depletion emerged as a major international issue in the s. This occurred primarily as a result of initiatives by the United Nations Environment Programme Morrisette, and the actions of the international scientific community Haas, , with the support of the international environmental movement.
The Vienna convention of embodied an international consensus that ozone depletion was a serious environmental problem. However, there was no consensus on the specific steps that each nation should take. A number of events in and created a new sense of urgency about the depletion of stratospheric ozone.
These included a rapid growth in demand for CFCs due to new industrial applications and the end of a global economic recession; important new studies by the World Meteorological Organization, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency EPA , and the United Nations Environment Programme; and, most important, the widely publicized.
In January , EPA initiated a series of workshops designed to build an international scientific consensus supporting the need to control the use of CFCs. In the same year, DuPont announced that its scientists had determined that CFCs were the most likely cause of ozone depletion.
These events persuaded American officials of the need for decisive international action. When negotiations on a protocol to the Vienna convention for controlling CFCs resumed in December , the United States adopted a firm position, calling for an international treaty not only freezing production of CFCs but also reducing production and consumption. Following extensive and complex negotiations, the Europeans, whose earlier opposition to a cutback in production had prevented agreement in Vienna, moved closer to the U.
They were persuaded to do so by three factors: the weight of scientific evidence, pressures from their own domestic environmental groups, and the fear that, in the absence of a treaty, the United States might take unilateral action to impose trade sanctions. While compromises on several controversial points proved sufficient to gain Japanese and Soviet adherence, the major developing countries e. Only after the Montreal Protocol was signed did the full extent of ozone depletion became public: ozone depletion over Antarctica reached a historic high in , and the link to the release of CFCs became a matter of scientific consensus.
DuPont responded by announcing that it planned to discontinue CFC production by the end of the century and, in March , countries called for the absolute elimination of production by the same date.
A resolution agreeing to totally phase out all production and consumption of CFCs by the year was adopted by 81 countries in May at the first governmental review of the Montreal Protocol. Taking advantage of this momentum, the parties to the Montreal Protocol, meeting at a review conference in London in June , were able to negotiate a series of strong amendments. These amendments accelerate the phaseout schedule for CFCs and halons and add methyl chloroform and carbon tetrachloride to the list of chemicals to be eliminated.
Equally important, the amendments establish an international fund to be used to assist developing countries in switching to substitutes for CFCs in the production of refrigerators and air conditioners.
On the strength of this. Why was it possible to reach a broad international agreement restricting CFCs? Analysts have identified four important factors: an evolving scientific consensus; a high degree of public anxiety in developed countries about the risks associated with the continued use of CFCs, due in large measure to an association with skin cancer; the exercise of political muscle by the United States; and the availability of commercial substitutes for CFCs Haas, ; Morrisette, The last served the critical role of diminishing the opposition of the chemical industry to a phased reduction.
When DuPont, the producer of 25 percent of all CFCs, decided to develop substitutes, it "forced other CFC manufacturers to follow suit or risk losing market share" Haas, Haas adds that, because this issue could be resolved by a technical fix, it did not involve any hard choices and therefore may be unique in the annals of global environmental change.
Another important influence in getting CFCs on political agendas may have been the efforts of the scientific community, which has been influential in drawing attention to other environmental problems Haas, Haas notes that it was initially a group of atmospheric physicists and chemists, most of whom worked in the United States, who attempted to place the issue of ozone depletion on the national and global environmental agendas, and that this community continued to press the issue throughout the s.
He argues that the speed of policy response in the United States may have been due to the "highly fragmented nature of American government and society [which] facilitates access of a strongly motivated group of technical experts" p.
Thus, the access of a key group to policy debates at the national level may have influenced international action on CFCs. The history of the ozone regime illustrates a number of key variables that affect the likelihood of reaching similar agreements on other global environmental problems Sand, b; Benedick, Further studies are desirable to clarify how these variables interact:. It also suggests that international agreements can be affected by the structures of national political systems, informal international communities, and markets that would be critically affected by agreement.
Energy efficiency is probably the most widely accepted strategy for mitigating global warming. The energy shocks of the s led to significant improvements in the energy productivity of Western industrialized economies. Between and , the United States reduced its energy intensity—the ratio of energy use to economic output—by 25 percent. The change was a sharp contrast to the record of the previous two decades and to most of the twentieth century.
Between and , U. To the extent that energy intensity can continue to improve in the United States and other countries, energy efficiency can make an enormous contribution to mitigating global warming. This section takes a closer look at how and why the change occurred in the United States and the implications for other countries.
After increasing for 40 years, U. Although the reasons are not well understood, the secular decline in energy intensity since has been attributed to improved efficiency in energy conversion, a. The behavioral change after was largely due to the oil shocks of and , which rapidly altered energy prices, changed perceptions of the future price and availability of fossil fuels, and brought about policy changes.
Energy users made three effective kinds of responses U. Department of Energy, ; Schipper et al. First, they changed the way they operated energy-using equipment, curtailing heat and travel, and improving management, such as by tighter maintenance of furnaces.
Such changes accounted for percent of national energy savings achieved in compared with the pre trend; estimates from U. Department of Energy, but are easily reversed when energy prices drop or incomes rise, as they did in the s.
Second, energy users adopted more energy-efficient technology to provide the same service with less energy use, either by retrofitting existing equipment e. These improvements were responsible for percent of total energy savings by Third, the mix of products and services in the economy changed. Demand fell sharply in energy-intensive industries, such as primary metals, relative to less energy-intensive industries; small cars got an increased share of the automobile market; and commercial airlines improved the match between aircraft size and demand on passenger routes.
Together, such shifts accounted for about percent of the energy savings achieved in Higher real energy prices are generally considered the most important single explanation for these responses International Energy Agency, ; U.
Department of Energy, However, price is not the whole story. Although the two energy shocks of the period had very similar price trajectories, the effects on the economic productivity of energy differed markedly after the first two years see Figure For the first two years of each shock, real energy prices increased about 40 percent and energy productivity increased about 5 percent.
But over the longer-term, the second shock had much more effect than the first. A five-year price increase of about 45 percent in increased energy productivity 7 percent; a similar increase in increased energy productivity 18 percent.
Moreover, the trend continued through several years of falling real energy prices. Why the different reactions to the two energy shocks? One explanation is perceptions: it took the second shock to get energy. Another is that the decision environment had changed by in ways that made it more likely the system would respond to price signals. Government policies to promote energy-efficient technology and provide necessary information were in place by , making it easier for energy users to respond effec-.
Moreover, U. Because these explanations reinforce each other, it is difficult to estimate their relative magnitude. The multiple explanations suggest that the price effect depends on other factors: technological change, policy choices, change in industrial structure, and information processing by energy users.
Since these factors can be changed independently of energy prices, it seems likely that with appropriate policies in place, energy intensity might have improved faster than it did, even in the apparently price-responsive period.
Energy conservation policy in the United States has been predicated on the theory that government should intervene chiefly to correct so-called market imperfections such as the tendency of a supply system based on market prices to produce too little environmental quality because individual consumers cannot be charged for it and too little information on energy-efficient technologies and their costs. The government can also intervene to mitigate regulatory and institutional barriers to the functioning of the price system.
Following this theory, many U. Experience with these efforts shows that the market imperfection theory needs to be expanded to take into account deviations in energy users' behavior from conventional economic rationality. Such processes within individuals and small groups have impeded the effectiveness of conservation programs in the United States, but when they are taken into account, programs became much more effective. Evaluations of incentive and information programs show that, although they are sometimes very effective at increasing the pace of adoption of available technology, success varies greatly, even between nominally identical programs Berry, For instance, home energy rating systems reach between 2 and percent of homes, depending on the market Vine and Harris, , and utility companies offering exactly the same financial incentive program for home retrofits typically have participation rates that vary by a factor of 10 or more Stern et al.
Success depends on a number of features of implementation. A key is getting the attention of potential participants with appropriate marketing efforts, targeting of audiences, selection of trustworthy sources of information, and other basic principles of communication Berry, ; Ester and Winett, ; Stern et al.
Getting people's attention appears to be the main barrier to the success of financial incentive programs for home retrofits, so that, paradoxically, "the stronger the financial incentive, the more the program's success depends on nonfinancial factors" Stern, Apparently, larger incentives ensure success among those who enter a program but do little to attract participants.
Finding the proper intermediary, such as a builder, manufacturer, designer, or lender, can also be critical. Home energy rating systems have been introduced most effectively with the active support of the building and lending industries Vine and Harris, , and residential conservation programs, especially in low-income areas, have often depended for success on involving highly trusted local organizations, such as churches and housing groups Stern et al.
Involving consumers in program design can help fit a program to its audience and locale Stern and Aronson, Thus, conservation policies and programs played a part in the U. Improved policies and implementation, along with higher prices, are among the reasons energy productivity improved faster at the end of the period than at the beginning. These three factors act in conjunction, however. If, for example, energy prices fall or remain stable, lowering energy users' motivation to change, some policy instruments will become less effective than they were in The trends of the late s demonstrate this effect U.
The technological potential for improvements in energy productivity are huge National Academy of Sciences, b; National Research Council, a. However, the worldwide prospects for implementing technological changes, and therefore for mitigating the release of greenhouse gases, depends on the behavior of several human systems, including world markets for fossil fuels, national policies for economic and technological development and energy management, global social trends in government and the development of technology, and the behavior of individuals and communities.
The world energy price and supply picture will affect the spread of the Western improvements in energy productivity to other countries. Under conditions like those of the late s, with relatively low energy prices and stable supplies, sharp further improvements in installed energy efficiency are unlikely, even in the Western industrialized countries, without new policy initiatives.
The price motive for efficiency is weak, policies that rely on that motive are undermined, and the lowered cost of energy is a spur to economic growth, particularly in energy-intensive sectors. Given continuing population and economic growth, those conditions point to increases in energy use in the wealthy countries, although probably not at pre rates of increase. A new round of sharp price increases would cut energy use both by reducing economic activity and energy intensity, at least for a period.
The world picture also depends greatly on the development paths of growing economies. Industrialization is energy intensive, enough to have overcome the effects of the oil shocks in relatively wealthy countries, such as Greece and Portugal, that were still industrializing.
Consumers' choices are also important. Where increased income goes into homes and durable possessions, as in Japan, energy productivity is more likely to be higher than where it goes into personal transportation, as in the United States, or into refrigerators or other energy-using appliances, as may become the case in China. The future of the dissolving socialist bloc countries holds many uncertainties.
Many of these countries have highly energy-intense economies and therefore seem to have room for improved energy efficiency given the rise of markets and more democratic control of policy. However, they lack finances to develop technology or implement incentive or information programs and need time to design and implement effective policies for local conditions.
Much room exists for research and for pilot experiments with policy options as ways to reduce the uncertainty. These and other human systems will determine the extent to which the Western experience with energy efficiency will proceed further or be repeated in other countries. The future will depend on the ways these systems interact in each country and on the ways national and local policies intervene in them. Intensification of the greenhouse effect is likely to alter rainfall patterns on a regional scale.
As a rule, regions that receive increased rainfall are likely to benefit; decreased rainfall is the more serious concern. The history of the human consequences of severe drought can be instructive about the variety of human consequences of, and responses to, unmitigated climatic change. The human role in causing drought in the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa is a matter of controversy.
Throughout the modern history of drought-famine association in the region, there has been a tendency to interpret extreme events as indicators of trends and to attribute the presumed trends to human mismanagement of the local environment. In fact, Sahelian droughts have been recurrent events. The droughts of the s and s were preceded by several others in this century, one of which, in , resulted in intense famine with high mortality.
The controversy over the human role in causing Sahelian drought revived with the drought of The prevailing view was that desertification was an anthropogenic process reflecting deforestation, overgrazing, overfarming, burning, and mismanaged irrigation resulting in salinization of soil and water. Lack of good data is a major obstacle to understanding the causes of Sahelian drought. Although some evidence supports the orthodox view, some recent research using remote sensing, field measurements, and intensive investigations of small areas has called that view into question.
Observable ecological changes are less significant than had been supposed and correlate better with rainfall records than with land management Mortimore, The consequences of Sahelian droughts in this century have depended on the ability of indigenous systems of livelihood to.
During the century, these indigenous systems have undergone continual change, first as a result of policies of colonial powers, and later in response to postwar development policies promoting ''modernization'' and further integration into the global economy. There are competing views of the effects of these century-long trends in political economy on the ability of local populations to withstand drought.
In one view, the main results were increased dependency and vulnerability; in the other, vulnerability decreased because of improved availability of medical care, famine relief, and a national infrastructure that allowed for easier.
The three major droughts of the century, in , in , and in the s, have had different effects on the lives and livelihoods of the local populations. The drought, which was of comparable severity to the drought of the s, appears to have produced greater increases in mortality; its effects on malnutrition and on the social fabric are harder to determine Kates, The knowledge base is better for comparing the droughts of the s and s.
Population continued to increase at up to 3 percent annually, forests continued to be cut for fuel and farming, and other forms of resource exploitation probably continued at about the previous rates. Grazing pressure fell, owing to animal mortality but, by the s, cattle holdings had recovered to 60 percent of predrought levels in some areas, and small livestock probably recovered more.
On balance, the human demands on the local environment were at least as severe as before the drought. The drought of the s was as severe as the previous one. Annual rainfall in was of the same order as in , and in some areas of the Western Sahel, less. Crop failures and pasture shortages were equally serious.
Yet famine did not occur on the same scale, and animal mortality was lower. Possibly food aid was earlier and better in some countries, but in northern Nigeria, where food aid was not a major factor in either period, social distress was noticeably less marked in the s, even in the worst affected areas.
What explains the relatively low human cost of the s drought? It was not the response of the affected governments. Political officials were taken by surprise about equally by both droughts.
The people most experienced in surviving failures of agricultural production and managing the environment were those living in the affected areas, but this group had little influence on policy. Of the several political interests concerned with the drought prob-. Consequently, proposals for new technologies for coping with the drought failed to take indigenous technologies and management systems seriously, and measures to strengthen the poor—for instance by insurance, improved access to resources, alternative job opportunities, and price supports—were rarely considered or given high priority.
A key to drought response appears to have been the role of indigenous forms of land use and response to food shortage. It is possible to distinguish two strategies of land use for areas like the Sahel that face recurrent drought or a long-term threat of declining rainfall. One strategy—maladaptive in the long run—is characterized by deforestation and overcultivation and leads to land degradation, decreases in productivity, and, in the event of drought, short-term collapse.
Another—adaptive in the long run—is based on flexible land use, economic diversification, integrated agroforestry-livestock management, and intensive use of wetlands. This pattern tends to generate sustainable, intensive systems and is resilient in the face of drought. Indigenous strategies of response to acute food shortage apparently enabled the Sahelian populations to survive notwithstanding the tardiness, inadequate scale, and maladministration of most relief programs.
These strategies, which relied on economic diversification, such as using labor in urban areas to supplement agricultural income, have evolved in an environment of climatic uncertainty and confer a degree of short-term resiliency. Their future evolution is hard to predict. Continued integration into the world economy may improve roads and other infrastructure, thus enabling diversification; it may also increase pressure for development of cash crops and thus hasten land degradation.
The ability of indigenous systems of land use and crisis management to cut the link between drought and famine depends on various factors that sustain the indigenous systems. These include diversity of economic opportunities, absence of war, and appropriate national and international policies on migration. Critical variables include the development of infrastructure and the set of national policies governing access to land, trees, and water. The social distribution of wealth, particularly secure rights of individual or community access to natural resources, determines the extent of human vulnerability to drought.
Although some impor-. Ruling and military elites, professionals in the civil service, traders especially in grain , capitalistic farmers, livestock owners, wood fuel exploiters, and small farmers and herders all have separate and distinct interests in the outcome, and most of these interests do not accord high priority to sustainable environmental management or drought preparedness.
Although not enough is known to forecast the consequences of future Sahelian droughts, two alternative scenarios can be imagined.
In the doomsday scenario, increasing numbers of people generate cumulative environmental degradation overcutting of woodland, overcultivation of soils, overgrazing of pastures, and overirrigating and possibly overuse of water , suffer increasing food scarcities as available grain per capita declines, and either starve in huge numbers or migrate in distress to other areas where they become permanently dependent on international relief.
In the optimistic scenario, farming systems intensify using an increased labor supply, productivity of the land is raised, sustainable agroforestry-with livestock systems are extended, and household income sources are diversified and slowly shifted via the market and short-term mobility away from agriculture and toward other economic sectors.
The experience of the s and s suggests that the optimistic scenario is a plausible alternative, given the right policy environment. Its success depends on increased recognition of the potential of indigenous sociocultural systems of land use and household strategies of economic diversification to increase resilience, and on policies that promote resource access and support those local social systems.
The consequences of future droughts may also depend on rates of urbanization, growth of the urban informal sector, and capital investment in better favored rural areas.
The present policies of governments and international organizations in the Sahel can create conditions that promote or impede the ability of indigenous systems to respond and thus determine the human consequences of future drought.
This section distinguishes seven human systems that may be affected by, and respond to, global change: individual perception, judgment, and action; markets; sociocultural systems; organized action at the subnational level; national policy; international co-.
It briefly surveys current knowledge and ignorance about the responses of each system and the relationships between them and identifies broad areas in which additional research is needed.
It also outlines particular research activities and needs within these areas. The human consequences of global change begin with the individual. Individuals notice the effects of change and either make adjustments or not. Individual behavior is critical in three quite distinct ways: individual judgments and choices mediate responses in all human systems because decision makers begin with inputs from individuals, whether themselves or their advisers. The consequences of global change often depend on the aggregation of the uncoordinated actions of large numbers of individuals.
And individual behavior can be organized to influence collective and political responses. Responses to global changes presuppose assessments of "what is happening, what the possible effects are and how well one likes them" Fischhoff and Furby, Knowledge about human judgment and decision is therefore relevant to understanding responses to global change. Normative decision principles, such as those of cost-benefit analysis or mathematical decision theory, are limited in their usefulness by the fallibility of the individuals who try to implement them Fischhoff, ; they are even more imperfect for estimating the behavior of people who are not trying Fischhoff et al.
Past research on human judgment and decision has clarified many differences between decision theory and actual decision making Kahneman et al. Behavioral decision research demonstrates that most people have difficulty comprehending the very low probabilities assigned to environmental disasters Slovic et al. Moreover, it is difficult or impossible to understand unprecedented events and therefore to make wise choices between mitigating them and adapting to them.
One result is that lay people frequently perceive environmental hazards differently from specialists Saarinen, ; Fischhoff and Furby, ; Gould et al. Little direct knowledge exists, however, on perceptions of climate, climate change, or other aspects of global change Whyte, ; Kempton, ; Doble et al.
Behavioral research also raises questions about expert judgment. Expert analyses, such as represented in general circulation models of climate, inevitably rely on judgment, and judgment becomes more unreliable when the models move into a future different from any past experience.
Faith in expert judgments rests on the analysts' success in identifying all the relevant variables and measuring them and their interrelations. Psychological research suggests that people, including technical experts, "have limited ability to recognize the assumptions upon which their judgments are based, appraise the completeness of their problem representations, or assess the limits of their own knowledge.
Typically, their inability encourages overconfidence" Fischhoff et al. Overconfidence is most likely to affect expert analysts when they lack experience testing their predictions against reality—an inevitable characteristic of predictions about unprecedented events Fischhoff, Other kinds of systematic error may also affect experts. For instance, in water resource management and other fields in which average climate parameters are used as a basis for decision, experts seem to exhibit a "stability bias," a tendency to underestimate the likelihood of extreme events Riebsame, ; Morrisette, Careful analysts also sometimes overlook or underestimate the likelihood of some possible combinations of events, as they did in a famous assessment of the likelihood of nuclear power plant failure in the s Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Little is known about how individuals or groups formulate alternative action plans when faced with a problem, such as responding to a global environmental change.
In particular, little is known about what facilitates or impedes creative generation of options, or how vested interest or attachment to the status quo may blind individuals or groups to available options.
Research Needs Research on what and how nonexperts think about particular global environmental problems can help estimate how individuals will respond to new information about the global. This research should address particular beliefs about global change as well as how people evaluate probabilistic and uncertain information and how they combine multiple bits of information from experts, mass media accounts, and personal experience e.
Such research will require both intensive methods of interaction with informants and survey methods. We have been using more and more natural resources, and this has come at a cost. If we lose large portions of the natural world, human quality of life will be severely reduced and the lives of future generations will be threatened unless effective action is taken.
Over the last 50 years, nature's capacity to support us has plummeted. Air and water quality are reducing, soils are depleting, crops are short of pollinators, and coasts are less protected from storms.
Prof Andy Purvis, a Museum research leader, has spent three years studying human interactions with nature. Alongside experts from more than 50 different countries, he has produced the most comprehensive review ever of the worldwide state of nature, with a summary published in the journal Science.
The latest report paints a shocking picture. We are changing nature on a global scale and the impacts of our actions are being distributed unequally. We just need to make sure the politicians remember that too. A diagram from the report showing the risk of extinction in different groups of species, assuming that species with limited or no data are equally threatened as other species in their taxonomic group. The world is increasingly managed in a way that maximises the flow of material from nature, to meet rising human demands for resources like food, energy and timber.
These activities necessitate deforestation, the degradation of land, loss of biodiversity and pollution, and they have the biggest impacts on land and freshwater ecosystems. Live coral cover on reefs has nearly halved in the past years and is predicted to disappear completely within the next 80 years. Coral reefs are home to some of the most diverse ecosystems on the planet. The number of alien species - species found outside their natural range - has risen, as humans move organisms around the world, which disrupts and often diminishes the richness of local biodiversity.
This, combined with human-driven changes in habitat, also threatens many endemic species. In addition, fewer varieties of plants and animals are being preserved due to standardisations in farming practices, market preferences, large-scale trade and loss of local and indigenous knowledge. Nature also benefits humans in non-material ways. We learn from it and are inspired by it.
It gives us physical and psychological experiences and supports our identity and sense of place. But its capacity to provide these services has also diminished.
The loss of ecosystems is caused mainly by changes in land and sea use, exploitation, climate change, pollution and the introduction of invasive species. Other causes are indirect. Those include demographic, economic, political and institutional arrangements underpinned by social values, and they interact with one another. For example, vast areas of land managed by Indigenous Peoples are experiencing a decline in ecosystems at a slower rate than everywhere else.
But the rights of Indigenous Peoples are being threatened, which could result in faster deterioration of these areas. This would have a detrimental impact on wider ecosystems and societies. The growing physical distance between supply and demand means people don't see the destruction caused by their consumption.
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